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For over a year now Pentagon investigators have been seeking access to a secret 
document from the KGB archives that sheds light on the American prisoner of war and 
missing in action (POW-MIA) issue. But, as usual when dealing with Russian archival 
questions, the Americans have thus far run up against a stone wall. It all began in 
January 1998 with the discovery of a reference to a "sensational document" among the 
personal papers of General Dmitri Volkogonov, now held in the archival collection of the 
Library of Congress. Volkogonov, the well-known historian and the author of biographies 
of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, served as Russian co-chairman of the Joint US-Russian 
Committee on POWs, established in March 1992 for the purpose of determining the fate 
of thousands of American servicemen who disappeared during the Korean and 
Vietnamese wars and various Cold War episodes. (Following Volkogonov's death from 
cancer in December 1995, General Vladimir Zolotarev took over as Russian co-chair of 
the committee.)
Having spent most of his career as a high-ranking political officer in the Soviet army and 
later as director of the Institute of Military History, Volkogonov had privileged access to 
secret documents well before the Russians began to open up their archives. Thus, in 
writing his biography of Stalin, which appeared in Russian in 1989, Volkogonov used 
many Stalin files unavailable to others.(1) In 1991, after renouncing his previous 
communist views, Volkogonov joined Boris Yel'tsin's administration, becoming head of a 
presidential commission for the transfer of CPSU and KGB records to the public 
domain, while continuing to write books. In the words of Russian archive expert Patricia 
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Kennedy Grimsted: "Volkogonov became the virtual court historian for the Yel'tsin 
administration."(2)
Despite official decrees providing for public (and hence equal) access to Russian 
archival documents, the system of special privileges for persons like Volkogonov 
continued. Often the privileges depended on money. The Foreign Intelligence Service 
(SVR), for example, received large payments from American publishers like Crown 
Books and Random House for documents from their archives. The catch, however, was 
that the SVR reserved the right to select what documents were released, thus ensuring 
that its historical interpretation of events would prevail.(3)
As for Volkogonov, it seems clear that he never had complete access to all KGB 
archives, or to the highly classified Presidential Archives, but that did not prevent him 
from emerging as the official Kremlin spokesman on controversial Cold War issues. 
Thus, for example, when Alger Hiss wrote to him in 1992 asking for materials on his 
case that might clear his name, Volkogonov claimed that "a thorough search of the 
archives had confirmed that Alger Hiss was never an agent of the intelligence services 
of the Soviet Union."(4) Later, however, when faced with a public furor, he had to qualify 
his statement, admitting that he did not review all the relevant documents.
The POW-MIA issue was another "hot potato" that was thrown Volkogonov's way. As 
Grimsted observes, the Yel'tsin administration made callous use of the intense American 
interest in this problem by appealing to the US Congress for more foreign aid in 
exchange for promising to find missing Americans.(5) Despite all the media attention, 
and considerable expenditures by the US government for the costly commission, there 
have been few revelations from the Russian archives. As might be expected, the 
American side was not allowed to search the archives, but rather was fed documents 
piecemeal by the Russians.
Russian officials repeatedly denied Soviet involvement with American POWs in Korea 
and Vietnam. Yet, from other sources, such as interviews with veterans of Soviet military 
2
intelligence and the discovery by the joint commission of files in the Soviet military 
archives at Podolsk, it has become clear that the Soviets carried out extensive 
interrogations of American prisoners during the Korean War. Their main goal apparently 
was to learn more about American military aviation from American pilots and crews. A 
key issue has been how many of these POWs were shipped to the former Soviet Union 
for questioning, with some experts speaking of a thousand or more and others 
estimating that only 25 or 30 Americans ended up there.(6)
Publicly Volkogonov maintained that he could find no evidence that American prisoners 
from either the Korean or Vietnam wars ended up in the Soviet Union. Apparently he 
was not telling the full story. Researchers from the joint commission came across the 
following statement by Volkogonov in an autobiographical sketch, dated August 23-26, 
1994, that was among his personal papers handed over to the Library of Congress:
! We helped the Americans clear up the fate of many of their countrymen in Korea 
! and Vietnam during the Cold War. I did everything that was in my power. I 
! consider this a matter of honor. I am not certain that we have fully clarified 
! everything. I know that quite a few documents were destroyed. However, one 
! document, probably sensational, is still in storage. I have a copy of it. Its content 
! is as follows: At the end of the 1960s the KGB ... was given the task of "delivering 
! informed Americans to the USSR for intelligence gathering purposes." When I 
! found this sensational paper in the "special file," I immediately went to Ye.M. 
! Primakov (director of foreign intelligence). He called his people. They brought a 
! copy of this plan, with the signature, it seems, of Semichastny (I will explain). For 
! a long time they looked for traces indicating that the plan had been carried out. 
! As I expected, they "did not find" these traces. They said the task had not been 
! accomplished. What really happened? The regime was such that the wildest 
! possibilities could be suggested. It remained a secret, which I was unable to 
! penetrate. I also did not report this to the much-esteemed ambassador, Mr. Toon. 
! I am speaking about this now, in the hopes that these notes will make it into my 
! book, Reflections.(7)
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This episode is repeated almost verbatim in Volkogonov's memoirs, published 
posthumously in Russian in 1998.(8) But there are differences. The book version omits 
quotation marks around Volkogonov's statement that they "did not find" any traces of the 
plan. Yet the quotations are important because they convey Volkogonov's skepticism 
about Primakov's efforts. Also, the book does not include Volkogonov's last two 
sentences, about his not informing Ambassador Toon (the American chairman of the 
joint commission) and his hope that this episode will appear in his memoirs. Clearly his 
Russian publishers did not want it to appear that Volkogonov had deliberately kept 
secrets from the Americans with whom he was working.
Not surprisingly, the discovery of these comments by Volkogonov among his papers and 
their subsequent appearance in his published book created a stir in Washington. After 
researchers for the joint commission searched the Volkogonov archives and found no 
copy of the document he referred to, officials in Moscow were approached. Yuri 
Kobaladze, head of the press office in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (now 
first deputy director of ITAR-TASS), insisted that all documents relating to US POWs 
had already been handed over to the Americans and that "if this document really exists, 
then it is not in the SVR archives."(9)
Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov, when asked in November 1998 about the document 
by US Vice President Al Gore, promised to cooperate in finding evidence as to whether 
there was a plan to seize American prisoners of war from Vietnam. It is doubtful, 
however, that anything will come of his promise. Mr. Primakov, whose ties to the KGB 
date back to the 1960s, is schooled in the tradition of deep secrecy that characterizes 
the entire intelligence establishment in Russia. Now, with the Communists who 
dominate the Duma increasingly vocal in their anti-Americanism, Primakov is even less 
likely to hand over any top-secret documents to the US.
But this will not prevent Primakov and SVR officials from exploiting the POW issue for 
their own interests. Rather than to put the matter to rest by either denying the existence 
of a plan to debrief American POWs in the Soviet Union or coming up with a document 
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that shows there was such a plan, the Russians would prefer to keep the Americans 
dangling. Such a strategy give the Russians a lot of leverage when they are negotiating 
with US government officials on a wide range of issues.
Was this Volkogonov's intention as well? If we consider how Volkogonov handled the 
controversy over Alger Hiss and also how gingerly he stepped around the POW-MIA 
issue in the past, we may not necessarily take the comments he made in his memoirs at 
face value. If his comments were true, then what became of the copy of a "sensational 
document" he said he had in his possession? In early November 1998 American 
members of the Joint Commission on POWs interviewed former KGB Chairman 
Vladimir Semichastny about the document to which Volkogonov referred. Semichastny 
claimed that no such document, signed by him, existed. He allowed, however, that the 
KGB might have discussed, "in a planning document," the use of captive Americans for 
intelligence-gathering purposes.(10)
Given that the fate of over 2,000 American veterans of the Vietnam War is still unknown, 
the US government has no choice but to pursue any leads that come its way, including 
Volkogonov's mysterious document. After all, in view of the fact that the Soviets brought 
substantial numbers of US Korean War POWs to their country, it seems fairly certain 
that at least some American POWs from Vietnam ended up in the Soviet Union as well.
(11) Jan Sejna, a former Czech intelligence officer, testified to the US Congress in 1996 
that he supervised the transfer of around 200 American POWs from Vietnam to the 
Soviet Union from 1961 to 1968.(12)
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the Russians will reveal their secrets on the POW-MIA 
issue anytime in the near future. For all their talk of openness and their claims to be 
declassifying documents, the archives of the security and intelligence services remain 
completely closed. Indeed, presidential decrees of 1995 and 1996 have reaffirmed the 
right of these agencies to control their own archives and thus keep their documents 
under wrap. The SVR is not above selling the odd file for profit -- as long as it paints 
Soviet foreign intelligence in a favorable light -- but this agency will not give its secrets 
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away for free, especially to the US government. With former SVR chief Primakov now a 
strong contender for the Russian presidency, it is unlikely that the situation will change 
anytime soon.
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